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state financial aid to restricted clubs." A definitive statement in this
area is long overdue, and the delay is largely responsible for the diver-
gent paths taken by the lower federal courts in Pitts, McGlotten, and
Green. When it comes, it is to be hoped that the Court will adopt an
approach that focuses on the real interests at stake, one more intellec-
tually coherent than the almost metaphysical attempt to find "signifi-
cant state involvement" in the mere grant of tax benefits.
JOSEPH W. FREEMAN, JR.
Constitutional Law-The Equal Protection Clause and the Student's
Right to Vote Where He Attends School
The right of students to vote in the communities where they attend
school has become an issue of vastly greater significance since the
twenty-sixth amendment was ratified on June 30, 1971. Now that the
age barrier has fallen,' the number of eligible student voters has in-
creased, as have fears in some college communities that students may
now be able to control local elections. Whether this spectre will mater-
ialize depends on many factors, but the principal obstacle remaining is
"The district court decision in Green was affirmed per curiam. Coit v. Green, 92 S. Ct. 564
(1971). In Pills the defendant did not appeal, and there has been no reported Supreme Court
disposition in McGlotten. Any future disposition of a recent Alabama federal district court deci-
sion, Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 337 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. Ala. 1972), should be noted. The
court there held that the city of Montgomery may not permit the use of its recreational facilities
by private segregated academies, saying "what is important is the effect the state's aid has on the
maintenance of a racially balanced public school system, but . . . the extent of the aid provided is
immaterial." Id. at 24. Turning to the problem of use of the same facilities by private groups other
than schools, the court felt
the test should be somewhat different. Whereas state and city officials are under an
affirmative obligation to end discrimination in situations involving education, this af-
firmative duty does not extend to cases involving private groups other than those affili-
ated with schools. Consequently, although state aid to such a group is unconstitutional
if the organization discriminates on the basis of race, the mere fact that such an organi-
zation is segregated is not enough to render state aid to it per se constitutionally impro-
per.
Id. at 25-26.
'A recent California case held unconstitutional the presumption that the residence of unmar-
ried minors is at the home of their parents. The fact that students brought the suit was only
incidental since the discrimination was "on account of age." Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565,
570-575, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699-703, 488 P.2d 1, 4-7 (1971); accord, Ownby v. Dies, 337 F. Supp.
38 (E.D. Tex. 1971) [declaring TEx. ELECTION CODE art. 5.08(m) (Supp. 1972) unconstitutional].
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created by state residence requirements, and assaults against that barri-
cade are already underway. This note will examine state laws that gov-
ern student voting in college towns and will evaluate the recent decision
by the Michigan Supreme Court in Wilkins v. Bentley,2 which held
unconstitutional a statute that hindered the establishment of voting resi-
dences by students in college towns.
I. THE LAW OF DOMICIL AND STUDENT VOTING RESIDENCE
The common pattern of residence requirements for voting includes
a presumption that students do not reside where they attend school. The
statute struck down by the Michigan Supreme Court in Wilkins was
identical in form to statutes in eighteen other states' and was substan-
tially similar to statutes in six states.' It stated: "No elector shall be
deemed to have gained or lost a residence . . while a student at any
institution of learning." 5
2385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971). The Wilkins court held that the statute violated the
due process clause as well as the equal protection clause, but it did not rest its decision on due
process grounds. Id. at 678-679, 189 N.W.2d at 427. The court's discussion of the due process
clause and its relation to the statute was taken chiefly from a law journal note, Restrictions of
Student Voting: An Unconstitutional Anachronism?, 4 J.L. REFORM 215, 221-22 (1970).
3ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 17 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.020 (1971); ARIZ. CONST. art.
7, § 3; CAL. ELECTIONS § 14283 (West 1961); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 2, § 11-13(5) (Supp. 1971);
IDAHO CONST. art. 6, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. 5, § 3; LA. CONST. art. 8, § 11; MINN. CONST. art.
7, § 3; MO. CONST. art. 8, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 54:10
(Supp. 1971); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 4; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2813
(1963): S.C. CONST. art. 2, § 7; TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 5.08 (Supp. 1972). All these statutes
explicitly enact presumptions. North Carolina has no such statute.
Ohio's statute, OHIO REV. CODE § 3503.05 (1960), was held to violate the equal protection
clause in Anderson v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (per curiam).
The New York statute was upheld against constitutional challenge in Gorenberg v. Board of
Election, 328 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App. Div. 1972), and in Whittington v. Board of Elections, 320 F.
Supp. 889 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). The current status of New York law is surveyed in Note, Student
Voting and the Constitution: New York State Bona Fide Residency Requirement, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 162 (1972).
The Texas statute was upheld in Wilson v. Symm, 341 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
'The following statutes do not specifically enact a presumption but provide that a student may
not gain a voting residence by attending a school. They are construed as not preventing the
acquisition of a voting residence by a student who can prove residence by facts other than his
enrollment in school. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 n.3 (1965). Mo. CONST. art. II, § 1;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.487 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-2-14(2) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 66 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.01.140 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-
118.3(k)(2) (Supp. 1971).
SMICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1011(b) (Supp. 1971), quoted in Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670,
675, 189 N.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1971). This statute has a protective aspect which presumes that a
student does not lose his residence by attending school. No issue is raised here about this aspect
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Virtually all states interpret voting statutes that limit the franchise
to residents as requiring that one must be domiciled in the community
in order to vote.' Domicil may be briefly defined as the place one
normally abides. To establish a domicil one must go to a place with the
intention of remaining there. Any absence must be considered tempo-
rary, and there must be an intention of returning to the former abode.
The difference between simple residence and domicil lies in one's atti-
tude and intentions.' A person might suppose himself able to determine
his own domicil. That is not the case, however, for when domicil is
called into question, a court is not bound to accept a party's declarations
as to his intended domicil but may look at extrinsic facts to make its
own determination." This power of the court is clearly necessary in non-
voting situations, as when jurisdictional questions or choice-of-law dis-
putes arise. If the court did not have this power, an interested party
could resolve the issue in his own favor. However, the result of applying
the same test to qualifications to vote is that one is not able to choose
his own voting residence.
In accordance with the interpretation of "residence" in voting stat-
utes as "domicil," state courts have created common-law presumptions
against domicil that in no way differ from the presumption in the Michi-
gan statute. The courts rightly assume that the ordinary student estab-
lishes residence at a college or university for the temporary purpose of
pursuing his education. In order to overcome the presumption, the stu-
dent must prove his intent to establish a domicil-a burden that is often
difficult to carry
Two views prevail among the states as to the ease with which a
student may acquire a new domicil. By the more stringent view, the
student must establish an intent to reside in the community permanently
or for an indefinite time-a period that does not terminate with his
graduation."0 By the more liberal view, once a student has established
of the statute because it preserves rather than inhibits the freedom to maintain a domicil of choice.
'See Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa 246, 5 N.W. 119 (1880); Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md.
66, 20 A. 434 (1890); Opinion of the Judges, 46 Mass. 587 (1843); Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302
(1872).
'White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 791-93, 8 S.E. 596, 597 (1888); Fry's Election Case, 71
Pa. 302, 309 (1872).
'E.g., Clark v. Clark, 71 Ariz. 194, 198, 225 P.2d 486, 488 (1951).
'E.g., Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 220 S.W.2d 592 (1949).
"The North Carolina Supreme Court recently adopted this view. Hall v. Bd. of Elections, 280
N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972). Other cases adopting this view are Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark,
292, 220 S.W.2d 592 (1949); Parsons v. People, 30 Colo. 388, 70 P. 689 (1902); Vanderpoel v.
1150 [Vol. 50
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his intent to abandon his former domicil, he may acquire a new one
where he presently intends to reside regardless of the fact that he may
intend to leave the place at a definite time in the future."
Courts utilizing the stringent indefinite-time test ignore a student's
renunciation of his former domicil unless his intended period of resi-
dence in the school community extends beyond graduation. 2 Abandon-
ment of former domicil was shown conclusively in two cases in which
seminary students had entered a religious order the rules of which re-
quired an oath of renunciation of all family ties and a pledge to regard
the seminary as their only home. Nevertheless, because the seminarians
were subject to transfer on completion of their studies, the proof of
abandonment of former domicil was held irrelevant."' The result in
such a case is that a student may be disfranchised completely even if he
renounced his former residence in good faith. 4 The extreme of disfran-
chisement was accomplished in New York when a student who lived in
a dormitory was denied the vote. He was a naturalized citizen whose
parents had come from Germany and spent only a brief time in this
country before emigrating to South America. Presumably he could have
voted in South America or in Germany, the country of his birth, but he
O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa 246, 5 N.W. 119 (1880); Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158 (1884); Goben v.
Murrell, 195 Mo. App. 104, 190 S.W. 986 (1916); In re Blankford, 241 N.Y. 180, 149 N.E. 415
(1925): In re Barry, 164 N.Y. 18, 58 N.E. 12 (1900); In re Garvey, 147 N.Y. 117, 41 N.E. 439
(1895): In re Goodman, 146 N.Y. 284, 40 N.E. 769 (1895); In re Sugar Creek Local School Dist.,
185 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1962); State v. Daniels, 44 N.H. 383 (1862); Fry's Election Case,
71 Pa. 302 (1872); Siebold v. Wahl, 159 N.W. 546 (Wis. 1916). Texas has enacted this view by
statute. See TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 5.08 (Supp. 1971).
"Cases following this view are Welsh v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 83 N.E. 549 (1907); Pedigo v.
Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E. 700 (1887); Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66,20 A. 434 (1890); Putnam
v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488 (1813); Chomeau v. Roth, 230 Mo. App. 709, 72 S.W.2d 997 (1934);
Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb. 82, 62 N.W. 249 (1895); Shirelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Vt.
1971).
New York abandoned a long line of precedent and implicitly adopted this position in Robbins
v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 108, 75 N.E.2d 617 (1947). California has enacted this view by statute.
See CAL. ELECTIONS § 14283 (West 1961).
12Hall v. Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972); Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa.
302 (1872).
13n re Blankford, 241 N.Y. 180, 149 N.E. 415 (1925); In re Barry, 164 N.Y. 18, 58 N.E. 12
(1900). If this strict test were applied to other segments of society, many non-students would also
be disenfranchised. For example, Methodist clergymen are often transferred at regular intervals.
Under this strict test they would never be able to acquire a new domicil after abandoning their old
one. See generally, MISS. CODE ANN. § 3235 (Supp. 1971). The absence of cases protesting such
treatment suggests that the law is not uniformly applied, although it purports to be based on general
principles of domicil law.
"In re Blankford, 241 N.Y. 180, 149 N.E. 415 (1925).
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was totally without a voting residence in his adopted country! 5
These are not unintended results. The policy behind the rule is to
limit a student's ability to vote where he goes to school. The New York
Court of Appeals candidly acknowledged this: "It may be urged that
the enforcement of this rule will render it well-nigh impossible for a
student to establish a residence in a seminary of learning, but the very
obvious answer is that the letter and spirit of the New York constitution
contemplate such a result."'" This policy seems to be grounded upon a
fear that concentrated student voting would be dangerous. Another
court said: "It certainly would strike one as extraordinary to learn that
it was in the power of those nontaxpaying sojourners [students] to wrest
the city or county government from the voice and hand of the permanent
citizens. '"17
Courts that take the more liberal view do not disregard evidence
that a student has abandoned his former residence. Of course, they do
not accept his declared intent as conclusive. 8 If there is evidence that
he is emancipated from his parents, 9 that he provides his own support,"
that he does not invariably return home on vacations but goes where he
can find work, 21 or that he has a family of his own, 2 then these courts
may find that his present residence is his domicil. Emancipation and
self-support are the most important factors in overcoming the presump-
tion that his residence at school is merely temporary. If he can demon-
strate these facts, the court will recognize the location of the school as
his domicil despite the fact that he may intend to remain there only for
a limited or definite time.
The fact that students plan to stay in one place only for a limited
time does not make them substantially different from other young peo-
ple. A surprisingly modern observation to this effect was made by a
court in 1813 in the earliest recorded case in which student voting rights
were litigated:
'5Watermeyer v. Mitchell, 275 N.Y. 73, 9 N.E.2d 783 (1937). Ironically, the first case in New
York to enunciate this strict standard was seeking to preserve the vote of a student at his former
residence while he was away at school. See In re Goodman, 146 N.Y. 284, 40 N.E. 769 (1895).
16ln re Garvey, 147 N.Y. 117, 123, 41 N.E. 439, 441 (1895).
"Goben v. Murrell, 195 Mo. App. 104, -, 190 S.W. 986, 988 (1916). Similar fears were
expressed in Anderson v. Pifer, 315 11. 164, 168, 146 N.E. 171, 173 (1925).
"Welsh v. Shumway, 232 111. 54, 87-88, 83 N.E. 549, 562 (1907).
"Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488, 500 (1813).
"Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 108, 111, 75 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1947).
21Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb. 82, 84, 62 N.W. 249, 250 (1895).
22Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 108, 111, 75 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1947).
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In this new and enterprising country, it is doubtful whether one
half of the young men, at the time of their emancipation, fix themselves
in any town with an intention of always staying there. They settle in a
place by way of experiment, to see whether it will suit their views of
business and advancement in life; and with an intention of removing
to some more advantageous position if they should be disappointed.
Nevertheless, they have their home in their chosen abode while they
remain. Probably the meaning of [the rule] is, that the habitation fixed
in any place, without any present intention of removing therefrom, is
the domicile. At least, this definition is better suited to the circumstan-
ces of this country.
23
The Missouri Supreme Court best articulated the policy that
should dictate a court's interpretation of voter residency requirements
when it said that election laws should be liberally construed in aid of
the right to vote. It dismissed the fear that a combination of students
might control an election as an unworthy ground for denying them
suffrage. Even the fact that students might not be taxpayers was held
to be an invalid consideration since that is not a prerequisite for voting.
The court found that students have an interest in electing officials be-
cause they are subject to local laws.
24-
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE APPLIED TO RESIDENCE
REQUIREMENTS
21
Although the Constitution recognizes the right of the states to
,determine voting qualifications, 28 the Supreme Court has held that state
legislative classifications must not violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.2 7 Dicta in recent Supreme Court cases con-
cede that states may limit the franchise to bona fide residents within this
constitutional limitation. 2s The two differing views of the way in which
a student may establish a new residence both assume that a finding of
local domicil is necessary before a student has the right to vote in local
elections and require a student to overcome a presumption that his
residence at school is temporary. The presumption, whether created
"Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488, 501 (1813).
21Chomeau v. Roth, 230 Mo. App. 709, -, 72 S.W.2d 997, 1000-01 (1934).
21This note will not examine the effect of durational residence requirements on a student's right
to vote. Students can generally meet duraitional residence requirements; they have a more difficult
time showing that they are bona fide residents of the town where they attend school.
6See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1904).
2E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
18See cases cited infra note 53.
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judicially or by statute, is merely an aspect of the law of domicil. In
theory all persons, not merely students, must prove domiciliary intent
before they are allowed to vote in local elections. 9 All persons whose
occupations require them to move regularly or who have entered into
short-term contracts to work in particular places must be able to resolve
judicial doubt as to their intent to establish a domicil. In order to do
this they must prove facts that will indicate this intent, such as purchase
of a home or auto registration. The necessity of proving intent elevates
the requisite evidence into additional qualifications for the right to vote.
However, it would be constitutionally impermissible to impose voting
qualifications consisting of the facts usually established by such evi-
dence." Even if this evidence is not viewed as an explicit qualification
for the right to vote, the application of the presumption against domicil
by reason of a person's "temporary" occupation presents a constitu-
tional issue as to whether this discriminatory classification denies a
person's right to equal protection when it denies him the privilege of
freely declaring his domiciliary intent once he has proved that he lives
in the community.31 At the present time, only two states statutorily
grant this privilege to students.
3 1
State legislative classifications are judged by one of two standards
under the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court normally gives
the states the benefit of the doubt and presumes that the classification
is constitutional. The Court will uphold a classification so long as the
legislative distinctions "bear some relationship to a legitimate state end
...[and are not] based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of
"Even when a statute does not violate the equal protection clause, the discriminatory applica-
tion of the statute may be unconstitutional. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
"Any qualifications based on wealth, such as requiring independent means 9f support to
prove a student's emancipation or requiring ownership of property to prove intent to remain in
the community, would be constitutionally impermissible. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 683 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
" Where students had to answer questionnaires as to their domiciliary intent, but no other
class of persons had to do so, the practice was held to violate the equal protection clause. Bright
v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. 
Ky. 1971).
"in Colorado a student may overcome the presumption that his residence at school is tempo-
rary by filing a written affidavit under oath with the county clerk that he has abandoned his former
domicil and established a new one. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-3-4(2) (1964). In Wisconsin a
student who resides part of the year with his parents may establish a new residence by electing to
register elsewhere. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 6.10(4) (1967). In 1971 Vermont deleted a provision similar
to that of Colorado. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 66 (Supp. 1971).
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that goal."33 However, when a fundamental constitutional right is
affected by the state legislative classification, the state must show that
the classification is necessary to promote "a compelling governmental
interest."34 The constitutionality of the presumption that a student's
presence at school is for temporary purposes turns upon which of these
two standards is applied.
The courts early recognized student residency requirements as hav-
ing two primary purposes.35 First, they serve to prevent fraud by identi-
fying the voter as a member of the community and by protecting against
the possibility of voting in two places. Secondly, they endeavor to
ensure that the voter is interested in matters pertaining to the com-
munity's government.3
Fraud can be discovered only by diligent investigation and adminis-
trative procedures that can detect simultaneous registration at two or
more places. The assumption is that a factual determination of domicil
would be the same no matter where the attempt to register was made.
Practically speaking, a person who maintains more than one residence
could easily convince officials in each place that he is domiciled there,
especially if he made false statements. Fraud becomes less possible when
one is an identifiable member of the community-but physical presence,
not domiciliary intent, distinguishes this factor. Once suspicion of du-
plicity arises, fraud becomes no more difficult to detect if the registrant
is allowed the freedom to declare his voting residence. These facts sug-
gest that an independent factual determination of domicil is at best
unnecessary for the prevention or detection of fraud.38
The other purpose of residence requirements is to ensure that the
franchise is limited to citizens who have an interest in the community.
Assuming that one who regards his residence as his home has a deeper
"McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808-09 (1969).
3'Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
ZGne purpose underlying stringent residence requirements is to disenfranchise students and
other "transient" citizens out of a fear that they might be able to control the elections. This purpose
was deemed constitutionally impermissible in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89. 93-94 (1965).
"Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302, 306-08 (1872); Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488, 502
(1813).
"Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 70-71, 20 A. 434, 435 (1890); see also Fry's Election Case,
71 Pa. 302, 311 (1872).
-"A factual determination of domiciliary intent by election officials is open to misuse by
unscrupulous officials. Registrars may require proof of domiciliary intent only from certain seg-
ments of society, omitting the requirement for others. See note 14supra. If one is allowed to declare
his intent to reside in a particular place, this particular form of discrimination would be obviated.
11551972]
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interest in the community than one who regards his residence there as
temporary, the question becomes whether a voluntary declaration of
domiciliary intent will not serve this purpose as well as a factual deter-
mination of intent. A voluntary declaration would seem to create an
interest in the community even if one did not exist before. A domiciliary
usually becomes subject to many of the obligations of citizenship-such
as local taxation, jury duty, and auto registration-which do not fall on
temporary residents. This fact alone would seem to ensure good faith
as much as possible. In addition, the interest of a voter is affected by
physical residence in the community as well as by domiciliary intent.
According to the Supreme Court, the "interest" that warrants a
vote is not a narrow concept. Persons who pay property taxes obviously
have an interest in how their money is spent. Persons who live in a
community but who do not pay a property tax are also interested in
local government: they are subject to the criminal laws, send their chil-
dren to public school, use municipal services, and are subject to gaso-
line, sales, and use taxes.39 They have an interest in being represented
in the state legislature because they are included in the census of the
local community on which apportionment of the legislature is based.4"
A student who physically resides in the community for a large part of
the year must inevitably qualify as an "interested" citizen. Only the
possession of a domicil elsewhere should exclude him from voting in
local elections.
Although one may properly conclude that a factual determination
of domicil as required by the rebuttable presumption of a student's
domiciliary intent is unnecessary or even superfluous, this does not force
a conclusion that the practice is unconstitutional. A factual determina-
tion of domicil is not "totally unrelated"'" to the legitimate state goals
of preventing fraud or limiting the franchise to interested voters, and
thus the practice of requiring it is not unconstitutional under the tradi-
tional equal protection test. However, if the compelling interest stan-
dard is applied, then no state will be able to show an interest sufficient
to support the presumption. An independent factual determination of
domiciliary intent does not serve the purposes of preventing fraud and
ensuring the interest of voters in any way that would not be better served
"'Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 424 (1970).
"Id. at 421. Students are included in the census where they go to school and not where their
parents reside. Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 579-81 (3d Cir. 1971).
"McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808-09 (1969).
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by a voluntary declaration of domiciliary intent by the voter. 2 Yet the
former method of establishing intent will inevitably exclude many "in-
terested" persons who subjectively intend to establish a voting residence
in the community. The latter method would exclude none of them. Thus
the high standards of exactness required by the compelling interest stan-
dard are not met."
III. WHICH STANDARD APPLIES?
Thus the crucial issue regarding the constitutionality of the pre-
sumption against domicil is whether the traditional or compelling-
interest equal protection test is applied. The Michigan court in Wilkins
v. Bentley44 applied the compelling-interest test on the theory that pre-
cedents had resolved the issue. That proposition is not entirely true, for
no prior Supreme Court cases apply directly to the issue in Wilkins.
The Michigan court determined that the statutory presumption of
non-residency placed a special "burden on the right to vote" of students
and quoted language from the Supreme Court decision in Williams v.
Rhodes45 to the effect that whenever the right to vote is "heavily bur-
dened," the state must show a "compelling interest" to justify the bur-
den.4" However, that language was taken from its proper context and
does not support the proposition for which it was cited in Wilkins. In
Williams, the issue was whether a state could restrict access by third
party candidates to the ballot for presidential electors. The Court held
that the Ohio restrictions diluted the effectiveness of the votes of quali-
fied voters who desired to vote for third party candidates. Thus the
"burden" in Williams fell on qualified voters whose right to vote was
recognized by the state." Other Supreme Court decisions have pointed
out that there is no fundamental "right to vote" as such." One's right
to vote depends on whether he meets the legitimate qualifications re-
quired by the state. If there were an unquestioned fundamental right to
vote, then the "compelling state interest" standard undoubtedly would
'"This point is discussed in text accompanying notes 36-41 supra.
"Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
"385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971).
'"The language appears in 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
"1385 Mich. at 670, 189 N.W.2d at 429.
1393 U.S. at 30-34.
"Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1904), cited in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,
91 (1965); see also, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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apply to any state restrictions of that right.49
Similarly, the Michigan court gave improper weight to other Su-
preme Court precedents which had established the principle that any
exclusion of bona fide residents who meet the other qualifications for
voting must be justified by a compelling state interest." The Michigan
court stretched the facts and language of those cases to hold that the
"exclusions" dealt with were something less than complete denials of the
vote and were mere "rebuttable presumptions" similar to the Michigan
statute.51 By this imaginative interpretation, the Wilkins court was able
to apply the "compelling interest" test to the Michigan statute without
confronting the fact that the Michigan statute was not designed to
exclude persons who were bona fide residents under traditional domicil
law. In the Supreme Court cases cited by the Michigan court, the ex-
cluded citizens were all stipulated to be bona fide residents by the states
concerned;5 2 the states argued against their "interest" in the elections
and not against their residence.53 The Supreme Court has never defined
the residency standards permissible under the equal protection clause.
Thus, the Michigan court was breaking new ground and not well-plowed
earth as the opinion would lead one to believe.
'.Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
5These cases all involved state exclusion of domiciliaries from the franchise. City of Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 206 (1970); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 421 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 703 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621,
624-25 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 (1966); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
5 The Michigan court said that what the Supreme Court termed an "exclusion" of qualified
voters was not a total denial of the right to vote. 385 Mich. at 682-83, 189 N.W.2d at 428-29.
Texas had enacted a conclusive presumption that servicemen resided where they had resided when
they entered the service. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965). The Wilkins court felt that
this did not prevent a serviceman from voting in another state and called it less than a complete
denial of the vote. However, Texas clearly had done all it could to deny servicemen the vote. The
Michigan court also said that when New York would not permit bachelors or persons who did
not own property to vote in school elections, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 701,
703 (1969), or when Louisiana, Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,703 (1969), and Arizona,
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 206 (1970), did not permit persons who did not
pay property taxes to vote for bond issues, the states were merely enacting "rebuttable presump-
tions" similar to the Michigan statute. That reasoning is patently absurd. Though one individual
might remove himself from the excluded class, the class of excluded citizens would remain un-
changed.
52Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91, 93-94 (1965); cited in Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419, 421 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969).
"3ln some Supreme Court cases in which voting rights under the equal protection clause were
considered, the concerned parties were qualified voters. E.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379
(1964); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 803 (1968). In all others they were
stipulated to be domiciliaries of the state. See cases cited supra note 51.
STUDENT'S RIGHT TO VOTE
Although Supreme Court precedents do not lead directly to a con-
clusion that the compelling interest standard applies to rebuttable pre-
sumptions against residency, one may glean from the opinions sound
principles that will support such a result. In Kramer v. Union Free
School District,54 the Supreme Court said that the presumption of con-
stitutionality and the "traditional approval given state classifications if
the Court can conceive of a 'rational basis' for the distinctions made
' 55
did not apply when there was evidence that the statute involved denied
the vote to qualified residents. The presumption of constitutionality is
based on the "assumption that the institutions of state government are
structured so as to represent fairly all the people. However, when the
challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge to this basic assumption,
the assumption can no longer serve as the basis for presuming constitu-
tionality." 56
One might argue that Kramer's express limitation of this principle
to residents was merely incidental to the basic idea that whenever the
assumption of the representative character of state government is called
into question, the traditional presumption of constitutionality will not
apply. The Court should carry Kramer one step further and apply the
compelling interest test whenever there is evidence that any person is
excluded from the franchise. Arguably, the Court should do so; de-
monstrably, it has not.57
The Court should give special consideration to the fact that a per-
son who challenges the representative character of state government has
exhausted every formal method of redressing his grievances when he
loses in court.51 Implicit in the traditional presumption of constitution-
ality is the idea that if a person who has challenged a state legislative
scheme loses in court, he may still seek to change the law directly by
exercise of his voting power. This alternative is not available to one who
alleges that he is unlawfully disenfranchised. If he is able to vote only
in another state or in federal elections, he cannot affect the legislative
scheme of the state that excluded him. Moreover, Congress apparently
'395 U.S. 621 (1969).
'Id. at 627-28.
s"Id.
"See note 54 supra. The "compelling interest" standard was rejected in Palla v. Board of
Elections, 40 U.S.L.W. 2835 (N.Y. Ct. App. June 7, 1972).
11Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring). Of course, one who is denied
a vote may always seek to change the law through moral suasion of the legislature. However, this
is hardly a guarantee that one's proposals will be treated fairly.
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lacks the power under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to change the state legislative scheme."
States have argued that a voter who cannot acquire a voting resi-
dence in one state is not thereby prevented from voting in the state
where he retains his domicil. 0 This fact should not cloud the issue. One
state cannot lawfully prevent a person from voting in another state; each
state separately determines the right to vote of those persons who seek
to vote in its own elections. If a state attempted to exclude people from
voting in the elections of another state, it would be violating a funda-
mental principle of state sovereignty.61 However, state policies that
make it difficult for students to acquire a new domicil require that a
student retain his old one if he wishes to vote at all. This may deny the
student the effective exercise of his voting right. The availability of an
absentee ballot does not refute this assertion. If one has removed from
a locality, he likely has little interest and information on which to base
a vote on matters of local concern. Thus one state may have a definite
impact on the composition of the voting populace in another state by
foisting on that state a class of voters who must either vote there or not
at all. The issue is one of national import and, therefore, is not an
appropriate subject for 'adicial deference to states' rights.
"Congress was said to have broad powers to determine when legislation is appropriate under
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966). There the Court upheld a Congressional prohibition of state laws that denied the right to
vote because of an inability to read English. The purpose of the legislation was to ensure that
Puerto Rican immigrants, among others, would be allowed to vote if they had attained the requisite
level of education. Id. at 643 n.l. However, Morgan was not followed in a more recent case in
which the Supreme Court held that Congress did not have the power to lower age qualifications
in state elections to age eighteen. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1971). It is not clear why
Morgan did not control that case. Various reasons were given to distinguish Morgan in the
separate opinions of the justices who formed the majority on that issue. Morgan was said to
uphold the power of Congress to ban "racial discrimination," id. at 129 (Black, J.), or discrimina-
tion against a "discrete and insular minority," id. at 296 (Stewart & Blackmun, JJ., & Burger,
Ch. J.). Four justices denied that Congress could be the judge of the appropriateness of legislation
enacted pursuant to the enforcement clause, id. at 204-05 (Harlan, J.), or could make a determina-
tion of substantive constitutional law that the compelling-interest standard applied to particular
state legislation, id. at 295-96 (Stewart & Blackmun, JJ., & Burger, Ch. J.). On any of the above
grounds Congressional legislation would be inappropriate to change state voting-residency laws.
Thus Oregon v. Mitchell must be read as having limited the application of the broad Congressional
power recognized in Morgan.
"Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 89 n.1 (1965); Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, -,
189 N.W.2d 423,'428-29 (1971).
"See Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201, 209-11 (1941).
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING
IV. CONCLUSION
Rebuttable presumptions as to a student's domiciliary intent do not
appear to be discriminatory in theory, because all persons are subject
to a factual determination of domiciliary intent under a strict applica-
tion of the law of domicil to voting residency laws. However, the burden
of factual proof is greater for those whose presence in the community
is for what are ordinarily conceived to be "temporary" purposes. Thus
students, unlike persons in other occupational categories, are not able
to vote in local elections after establishing that they dwell in the com-
munity and declaring their domiciliary intent. This discrimination is not
strictly necessary to achieve any legitimate state purpose and cannot be
sustained under the equal protection clause if the "compelling interest"
standard is applicable. That standard should be invoked by the courts
whenever any person is denied the vote, whether or not he be an admit-
ted resident by state standards. A citizen's vote is the foundation of our
representative democracy. Any state abridgement of access to the yote
should be given the closest judicial scrutiny. The equal protection clause
requires no less!
VANCE BARRON, JR.
Here's to You Mrs. Robinson-Title VII and the Hangover Effect of
Prior Racial Discrimination in Hiring
Mrs. Dorothy Robinson applied for a job with the P. Lorillard
Company at its Greensboro, North Carolina, plant following its open-
ing there in 1956.' Mrs. Robinson was referred to the North Carolina
Employment Service Office, an exclusively Black agency. All of Loril-
lard's Black job applicants were referred to that office. During this time,
Lorillard practiced a policy of racial discrimination in its hiring policy.
Mrs. Robinson was allowed to apply only for a position in one of the
"Black" departments of the Company. She accepted a job in the
"Black" service department and had worked for Lorillard from that
time.2
Mrs. Robinson and her fellow employees, both Black and White,
'During the course of the litigation discussed below, P. Lorillard Company changed its name
to Lorillard Corporation.
2Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835, 836-37 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
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